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Insurance/Civil Procedure-STATUTE WHICH PROHIBITS THE
JOINDER OF A LIABILITY INSURER IN AN ACTION AGAINST ITS INSURED
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL-VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Insurance Co., 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983)
On June 25, 1982, Ara Williams VanBibber sustained an injury
in a Publix grocery store when a Publix employee pushed a shop-
ping cart over her foot and ankle.' VanBibber brought an action
against Publix and its liability insurer, Hartford Casualty Insur-
ance Corporation, for a number of afflictions either caused or ag-
gravated by the employee's action.2 Hartford filed a Motion to Dis-
miss and/or Strike, seeking its dismissal from the action as a party
defendant pursuant to section 627.7262, Florida Statutes.3 The
trial court granted Hartford's motion, finding the nonjoinder stat-
ute constitutional both on its face and as applied to the facts and
parties in the case.4 The First District Court of Appeal certified
1. Brief of Petitioner at 2, VanBibber v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880
(Fla. 1983).
2. Id.
3. Id. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (Supp. 1982) (now codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1983)),
which was in effect at the time VanBibber brought her action, provided:
Nonjoinder of insurers.-
(1) It shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance of a
cause of action against a liability insurer by a person not an insured under
the terms of the liability insurance contract that such person shall first ob-
tain a judgment against a person who is an insured under the terms of such
policy for a cause of action which is covered by such policy.
(2) No person who is not an insured under the terms of a liability insur-
ance policy shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third-party
beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first obtaining a judgment against a per-
son who is an insured under the terms of such policy for a cause of action
which is covered by such policy.
(3) Insurers are affirmatively granted the substantive right to insert in
liability insurance policies contractual provisions that preclude persons who
are not designated as insureds in such policies from bringing suit against
such insurers prior to first obtaining a judgment against one who is an in-
sured under such policy for a cause of action which is covered by such pol-
icy. The contractual provisions authorized in this subsection shall be fully
enforceable.
4. Record at 20-21, 37, VanBibber. The trial court stated that Hartford should be dis-
missed as a party until such time as VanBibber had obtained a judgment against Publix,
thereby satisfying the statutory condition precedent. This decision was contrary to the over-
whelming majority of circuit court judges who had ruled on the statute since it was passed.
Prior to VanBibber, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers (AFTL) reported that of the 14
circuit court judges who had ruled on the statute, 11 had declared it void, 2 had upheld it as
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the appeal as either passing on a question of great public impor-
tance or having a great effect on the proper administration of jus-
tice throughout the state.8 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the order of the trial court to the extent that it held the statute
constitutional but reversed that portion of the order which held
the statute applicable to the instant action.'
Just five years prior to this decision the Florida Supreme Court
had declared a similar statute unconstitutional in Markert v.
Johnston.7 The court had found that because the statute prohib-
ited the joinder of the liability carrier at the commencement of the
lawsuit, yet provided for possible joinder of the insurer at a later
time in the proceedings, it thereby constituted an unconstitutional
invasion of the court's exclusive rulemaking authority.'
This note will examine the differences between the two statutes
ruled upon by the supreme court and focus on the issue of whether
an injured party's right to join a liability insurer in an action to
determine the liability of the insured is substantive in nature, and
thereby within the purview of the legislature, or a procedural right
which is governed by the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking
power. This note will discuss the historical development of this is-
sue as determined by the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court,
and it will explore the rationale and soundness of those decisions
along with their constitutional implications.
I. HISTORY: JOINDER OF LIABILITY INSURER IN AN ACTION AGAINST
THE INSURED
In the early days of insurance underwriting courts generally con-
sidered liability insurance to be an indemnity agreement between
the insurer and the insured, rather than a contract insuring against
liability under which an injured third party would be considered a
third party beneficiary. Under this approach the insured under the
policy had no cause of action for indemnification until such time as
he had actually satisfied a judgment for an injured third party,
valid, and 1 had declared it to be prospective only. See 254 AFTL J. 12 (1983); 246 AFTL J.
11 (1983); Supplements 247 AFTL J. 18 (1983) and 249 AFTL J. 22 (1983).
5. Brief of Petitioner at 3, VanBibber.
6. VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 883. Because the incident on which the cause of action was
based occurred prior to the effective date of the contested statute, October 1, 1982, the law
in effect at the time of the incident (which permitted the joinder of the liability insurer) was
controlling.
7. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
8. Id. at 1006.
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thereby incurring a pecuniary loss. Accordingly, an injured party
lacked standing to bring an action against an insurance carrier; a
contract of indemnity precluded standing as a third party benefi-
ciary; and the condition precedent of a satisfied judgment pre-
vented the injured party from asserting horizontal privity in an at-
tempt to enforce a cause of action by the insured against the
insurer.'
This early approach created harsh results where an insured
tortfeasor was insolvent or bankrupt and thereby judgment proof.
Because the insured was unable to satisfy a judgment entered
against him, either wholly or partially, he suffered no monetary
loss which obligated the insurer to make any payment on the pol-
icy.10 Under this scenario the injured party was unable to recover
from either the insured or the insurance carrier and hence was un-
able to satisfy his judgment.
In response to the plight of seriously injured persons who re-
mained uncompensated, state legislatures finally began to enact re-
medial legislation. A typical enactment provided that "'the insol-
vency or bankruptcy of the person insured . . . shall not release
the insurance carrier from the payment of damages for injury sus-
tained or loss occasioned during the life of the policy,' subject to
the limits of the policy."'1 These remedial enactments also pro-
vided that if the judgment against the insured for injuries or loss
remained unsatisfied for a specified length of time, the injured per-
son was entitled to maintain an action "against the insurer under
the terms of the policy for the amount of the judgment not exceed-
9. Nor could the injured party join the insured and the insurer as party defendants
where the policy was considered a contract of indemnity. Early courts rejected this approach
on the grounds that it constituted the improper joinder of an action ex contractu with an
action ex delicto. See, e.g., Smith Stage Co. v. Eckert, 184 P. 1001, 1003 (Ariz. 1919), where
the court held that joinder of the liability insurer in an action to determine the insured's
negligence was improper:
There is also a misjoinder of parties defendant. They are not jointly liable on the
policy. The [insured's] liability is one imposed by law for negligence. The indem-
nity company's liability is one arising out of contract. Their liabilities are separate
and distinct. The [insured] could not be sued on the policy, as it has assumed
none of the obligations thereof; nor can the indemnity company be sued for the
tort, as it was not a party to it. The two causes of action do not run against or
affect both of the defendants, which we have held to be necessary before they can
be joined as defendants.
Accord Russell v. Burrough, 188 S.E. 451 (Ga. 1936); Ellis v. Bruce, 245 N.W. 320 (Iowa
1932); Ziegler v. Ryan, 262 N.W. 200 (S.D. 1935); Corwell v. Hays, 136 S.E. 604 (W. Va.
1927).
10. 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 20.02 (1983).
11. N.Y. INS. LAW § 109 (1917), as cited in 3 R. LONG, supra note 10, at § 20.02.
1984]
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ing the amount of the policy."12
These statutes were the predecessors of present day "no action"
clauses.13 They gave an injured party a right of action against an
insurer, but only if the injured party first obtained a judgment
against the insured. 14
The principal rationale advanced by liability insurers for in-
serting "no action" clauses into insurance policies is that joinder of
an insurer causes the jury to believe that a substantial verdict will
work no economic hardship upon the party who must satisfy the
judgment. One prominent scholar commented in an early article:
It is a well-known fact to every attorney familiar with personal
injury cases that if the plaintiff can make the jury realize that the
defendant is insured he greatly increases his chance of recovering
a large verdict, or for that matter, a verdict of any type. The same
body of [persons] which will hesitate to penalize an individual
where the elements of negligence do not clearly preponderate in
favor of the plaintiff has no such compunctions against returning
a substantial verdict against an insurance company.
It is, of course, obvious that if the insurer is joined as a party
defendant to the personal injury action the element of insurance
is constantly confronting the jury. 5
12. 3 R. LONG, supra note 10, at § 20.02.
13. 1 id. at § 1.08. An example of a standard "no action" policy provision reads as
follows:
Action Against Company. No action shall lie against the company unless, as a
condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the
terms of this policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall
have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual
trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.
Id.
Similar language is required by N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(1)(b) (McKinney 1983) to be in every
policy before that policy is issued or delivered to the insured. The "no action" clause was
originally intended for the benefit of, and to be enforced by, an injured person in an action
against the insurer. Such statutes are remedial in nature and manifest an intent to modify
the common law under which an injured person did not have a right of action against the
insurer because there was no privity of contract between the insurer and the injured person.
1 R. Long, supra note 10, at § 1.08.
14. Today a "no action" statute is viewed not as a benefit to the injured party but as an
obstacle to relief. The statute operates to prevent a direct action by the injured party
against the insurer because the injured party must first obtain a judgment against the in-
sured before he can join the insurer. 3 R. LONG, supra note 10, at § 20.02.
15. Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as Parties Defendant, 22 MARQ. L.
REV. 75, 75 (1938). See also 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4861 (1981); W.
PIERSON, THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY AND BASIC DEFENSE TACTICS § 140 (1956).
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The Florida Supreme Court has rejected this rationale and consist-
ently taken the position that the admission of the existence of in-
surance coverage at trial "should be more beneficial to insurers in
terms of diminishing their overall policy judgment payments to lit-
igating beneficiaries than the questionable 'ostrich head in the
sand' approach which may often mislead juries to think insurance
coverage is greater than it [actually] is." 16
The Florida Supreme Court first considered the propriety of the
joinder of an automobile liability insurer in an action to determine
the liability of the insured in Artille v. Davidson.17 In Artille the
joinder of the insurer was predicated on an insurance contract
which had been issued to the tortfeasor in which the insurer had
agreed to "settle or defend against claims resulting from the liabil-
ity imposed upon the insured by law."'18 The supreme court held
that the lower court's order sustaining the demurrer by the insur-
ance company was without error.1 9
It was not clear to the court whether the insurance contract was
a liability contract for the benefit of a third party or an indemnity
contract for the benefit of the insured. The court elected to treat it
as if it were the latter, thus avoiding the determination of whether
an injured third party was an intended beneficiary of a liability
contract.20 The court reasoned that even if the facts alleged in the
declaration against the insurance company were true, there could
be no breach of contract until the insurance company failed to dis-
charge its obligation to either settle or defend claims against the
insured.2 Thus, if there had been no breach of contract which
16. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 718 (Fla. 1969).
17. 170 So. 707 (Fla. 1936).
18. Id. at 707. In Artille the plaintiff was allegedly injured in an automobile accident as
the result of the defendant's negligence. In an amended pleading the plaintiff brought an
action against the insured and his liability insurer. The defendants demurred to the plead-
ings, and judgment was entered in their behalf. On appeal the plaintiff conceded that the
insurer had no tort liability arising out of the automobile accident and rested his case on the
language of the policy. Id.
19. Id. at 708. The amended declaration contained two counts: one count against John
Davidson, the owner of the automobile, and the second count against the insurance com-
pany. The court held that the declaration stated a good cause of action against Davidson,
and hence the judgment based on sustained demurrers as to both defendants should have
been conditioned upon the failure of the plaintiff to further amend the declaration by elimi-
nating the insurance company as a party defendant within a reasonable amount of time.
20. The Artille court noted that no copy of the policy had been attached to the com-
plaint. The plaintiff, in his pleadings, apparently did not consider the distinction to be sig-
nificant, referring to the policy as "an automobile liability and indemnity policy of insur-
ance." Id. at 707.
21. Id. at 708.
19841
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would give to the insured the right to maintain an action on the
policy against the insurer, such a right could not accrue to an in-
jured plaintiff having a claim against the insured even assuming
that he were in fact a third-party beneficiary. 22 The Artille court
described the circumstances of those cases in Florida in which a
third party had been permitted to maintain a suit against the in-
surer and found that none of these circumstances were present in
the instant case.2 3
II. Shingleton: PUBLIC POLICY OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
In 1969, thirty-three years after the decision in Artille, Florida
became the first state to adopt direct action by judicial fiat when
the supreme court decided the landmark case of Shingleton v.
Bussey2 4 While the court did not explicitly state its holding, it is
clear that the disposition of the case rested upon the Shingleton
court's recognition of the right of an injured party to join the in-
surer in an action to determine the liability of the insured.25 What
is not clear is whether that right was grounded on public policy
considerations, on constitutional rights, or on some combination of
the two. Indeed, the Shingleton opinion is replete with language
supporting both bases.
In overruling Artille, the court concluded that "a direct cause of
action now inures to a third party beneficiary against an insurer in
motor vehicle liability insurance coverage cases as a product of the
22. Id.
23. Id. A third party had been permitted to maintain a suit against the insurer where
the
right was based either upon a contract between the insurer and the insured plus a
contract between the insured and the party maintaining the suit, or in cases where
the statute gives the injured party the right to maintain the suit against the in-
surer of the party responsible for the injury, or in cases where judgment has been
rendered against the insured and the insured has failed to pay the judgment, in
which cases the judgment became equivalent to a contract and brought about
privity between the plaintiff holding the judgment and the insurer liable to the
insured for the payment of such judgment. Neither condition exists in this case.
Id.
24. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
25. The court's decision to grant a right of joinder to an injured third party plaintiff may
have been prompted by the insurance industry's position in the prior case of In re Rules
Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969). In that case, the insurance
industry successfully opposed a proposed Florida Bar rule which would have limited the use
of in-house counsel to represent policyholders in litigation. The industry argued that in ac-
tions to determine the liability of the insured, the insurer is a real party in interest and
therefore should be permitted to defend the insured with in-house counsel.
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prevailing public policy of Florida. 2 6 Expounding upon the ration-
ale of the district court, the supreme court recognized by operation
of law that an injured party is in privity to a "quasi-third party
beneficiary contract" entered into between the insurer and the in-
sured,27 thereby rendering the insurer amenable to an action
brought on the contract by the injured party.28
The court was aware of the fact that the majority of those juris-
dictions which had had the opportunity to adjudicate the efficacy
of "no action" clauses had sustained them as a bar to a direct ac-
tion against an insurer in an action to determine the liability of the
insured.2" Nevertheless, the Shingleton court was "convinced that
the time has arrived when the legal reasons advanced in favor of
joinder and direct action against an insurer outweigh and prepon-
derate over the traditional notions asserted to justify precluding an
injured third party from enjoying such rights."3
The primary reason advanced in those jurisdictions which have
sustained "no action" clauses is that they serve to prevent
26. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 715 (emphasis added). To support the proposition that the
judiciary may incorporate the prevailing public policy into the corpus juris the court cited
the "classic opinion" by Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 211 N.E. 1050
(N.Y. 1916).
27. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 715. The court cited extensively to the Illinois appellate
court decision of Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 208 N.E.2d 12 (I1. App. Ct. 1965), to support its
third-party beneficiary rationale. It is interesting to note that in Gothberg the injured plain-
tiff had already secured a judgment against the insured and was bringing a separate action
against the insurer. The plaintiff in Shingleton had not recovered a judgment against the
tortfeasor at the time he sought to bring a direct action against the insurer.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has consistently rejected the argument that an injured
party has a right of direct action against the insurer on the ground that it is contrary to
"firmly-fixed public policy." Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 239 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1968).
See also Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 281 N.E.2d 659 (II. 1972).
The Gothberg court also noted that the injured plaintiff's interest in the insurance con-
tract was buttressed by the language of the policy itself. The policy contained a specific
provision inuring to the benefit of injured persons, giving them the right to recover from the
insurer after securing a judgment against the insured: "Any person or organization or the
legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment . . . shall thereafter be entitled
to recover under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy."
Gothberg, 208 N.E.2d at 20-21.
The most narrow interpretation of Gothberg is that an injured party who first obtains a
judgment against an insured then becomes a third-party beneficiary to the. contract between
the insured and the insurer and as such has a cause of action against the insurer.
28. The question of when an injured third-party beneficiary may exercise his right to
bring suit on the cause of action is resolved by the effect of (1) the rules of civil procedure,
(2) the provisions of the insurance policy itself, and (3) the process of weighing certain coun-
tervailing public policies present in each case. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 716.
29. See, e.g., 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 15, at §§ 4851-67 (1981); R. KEETON, INSURANCE
LAW § 7.11 (1971).
30. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 717.
1984]
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prejudice to the insurer by isolating from the jury's consideration
any knowledge that coverage for the insured exists."1 The Shin-
gleton court felt that the assumption that a jury is more inclined
to find liability or to augment damages when it thinks an insurance
company will bear the loss was no longer applicable because juries
today are more "mature. '3 2 The court went as far as to suggest
that a candid admission at trial of the existence of insurance and
its policy limits would "be more beneficial to insurers in terms of
diminishing their overall policy judgment payments to litigating
beneficiaries."3 3
The Shingleton court implied that a number of constitutional
rights would be denied an injured plaintiff if the effect of a "no
action" policy provision was to preclude him from maintaining a
cause of action against the insurer. The court reasoned that motor
vehicle liability insurance is a subject affected with a public inter-
est and that its regulation is for the protection of the general pub-
lic. Thus, the court concluded that it would not be unreasonable to
limit the effect of express contractual provisions where they would
collide with those considerations which affect the interests of the
public generally, "[w]here, for example, [insurance policies] collide
with principles of due process and equal protection, and the right
to a full and adequate remedy of law guaranteed all citizens."'
Recognizing further constitutional transgressions, the court stated
that a policy provision prohibiting direct action against the insurer
seeks to obviate the right of an injured third-party beneficiary to
maintain a cause of action against the insurer, and that "[t]his
hardly comports with Section 4, Declaration of Rights, State Con-
stitution . . . that the courts shall be open so that persons injured
shall have remedy by due course of law without denial or delay."3 5
In what was surely the impetus for later legislative action, the
court remarked that the liberal joinder provisions of Rule 1.210(a),
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,3" were applicable only in the ab-
sence of any legislative action granting insurers the substantive
right to insert "no joinder" clauses in liability policies.3 7
31. See supra text accompanying note 15.
32. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718.
33. Id. See supra text accompanying note 16.
34. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 717.
35. Id. The suit in Shingleton was filed prior to June 1968 and was thus controlled by
the Constitution of 1885.
36. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) provides in pertinent part: "Any person may be made a
defendant who has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff."
37. This requirement of the procedural rules raises the presumption that unless the
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If, in fact, an injured plaintiff's constitutional rights are violated
by denying him the right to join an insurer in a suit to determine
the liability of its insured, as language in Shingleton arguably sug-
gests, would not those constitutional rights also be violated if the
legislature granted a substantive right to insurers to insert "no
joinder" clauses in liability policies? If, however, Shingleton is
grounded on public policy considerations alone, with no constitu-
tional implications, as other language in Shingleton implies, then
presumably the legislature could grant liability insurers the sub-
stantive right to insert "no joinder" provisions in liability policies
through the exercise of its police power regulation of the insurance
industry.
III. FROM Shingleton TO Markert
The Shingleton decision, while clearly reversing Florida law on
the joinder of -automobile liability insurers, created many new
questions which the court soon had the opportunity to address. In
Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory,ss a minor sued Beta Eta House
and its liability insurance carrier for personal injuries caused by
the alleged negligence of Beta Eta House in the maintenance of its
premises. The insurance carrier, joined as a party defendant under
the doctrine of Shingleton, moved for dismissal, and the motion
was denied. The appellate court certified two questions to the su-
preme court.39 In resolving the first question the supreme court ex-
tended the principles announced in Shingleton by holding them
applicable not only to automobile liability insurance, but also to
"other forms" of liability insurance.40 In its resolution of the sec-
Legislature in the exercise of its police power regulation of insurance, affirmatively
gives insurers the substantive right to insert "no joinder" clauses in liability poli-
cies there is no basis in law for insurers to assume [that] they have such contrac-
tual right as a special privilege not granted other citizens to contract immunity
with their insureds from being sued as joint defendants by strangers.
Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718-19.
38. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
39. The questions presented were:
(a) [whether] the principles announced [in Shingleton] are applicable not only
to automobile liability insurance but also to other forms of liability insurance; and
(b) whether the suggested procedure for preserving the substantive law of Florida
by ordering separate trials pursuant to Rule 1.270(b), [Florida] Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, in those cases where the liability insurance carrier is joined as a defendant
in a tort action against its insured should be followed by the trial courts of this
state.
Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 164.
40. Id.
19841
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ond question, the Beta Eta court seemingly receded from Shin-
gleton's effect by affirming the insurer's right to a separate trial
pursuant to Rule 1.270(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.'
While the Beta Eta court held that the trial court may, on motion
of either party, order separate trials pursuant to Rule 1.270(b), the
court quoted approvingly from language contained in the opinion
of the district court of appeal which read:
Pursuant to the provisions of this rule the trial court should on
the motion of a party order that the issues relating to the cause of
action sued upon be first tried under circumstances which exclude
any reference to insurance, insurance coverage or joinder in the
suit of the insurer as a codefendant. 42
The Beta Eta court stressed that Shingleton had endeavored to
facilitate discovery proceedings, settlement negotiations, and pre-
trial hearings, but that Shingleton did not alter the long-estab-
lished policy of keeping all evidence of liability insurance from the
jury:, 3 "The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no
bearing on the issues of liability and damages, and such evidence
41. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b) provides: "The court in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third
party claim or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third party claims or issues."
42. Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 165 (emphasis added).
43. Id. In a separate opinion Justice Boyd argued that because the majority opinion af-
firmed the holding of the district court which required an automatic severance when a lia-
bility insurer is a codefendant in a suit with its insured, equal protection and due process
are offended by giving liability insurance carriers special treatment which is not afforded
other codefendants. Id. at 166 (Boyd, J., concurring and dissenting). However, the majority
opinion explicitly modified the district court's opinion by stressing that a trial court is not
required to grant a severance when a liability insurance carrier is a codefendant. The major-
ity emphasized that the trial court has discretion on this issue. Id. at 165.
Chief Justice Ervin, in a separate opinion, argued that it would be better "to eliminate
furtive conjecture on the insurance factor by fully disclosing its presence to the jury. Such
disclosure. . . would tend to encourage juries to adopt and implement a more honest analy-
sis and consideration of the insurance factor .. " Id. at 168 (Ervin, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (emphasis added). The chief justice went on to state that "complete disclosure of
the insurance feature to the jury would seem to increase the probability that prejudice gen-
erated by insurance would be detectible [sic] through a proper utilization of methods pres-
ently available for challenging and testing the adequacy of a jury's verdict." Id. (emphasis
added).
The chief justice recognized that jurors are prejudiced when they obtain information that
the defendant is insured. This "consideration of the insurance factor" and "prejudice gener-
ated by insurance" referred to by Chief Justice Ervin is the very foundation for the insurer's
argument that joinder should not be permitted. Arguably, the presence of insurance should
not be a consideration in determining a defendant's liability and damages.
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should not be considered by the jury." 44 Consequently, a timely
motion to sever by an insurer codefendant was all that was neces-
sary to give the trial judge the opportunity to circumvent the prin-
ciples of Shingleton.
In Stecher v. Pomeroy45 the supreme court took occasion to clar-
ify the Shingleton and Beta Eta decisions. In Stecher the limits of
the insurance policy were disclosed to the jury. The trial court re-
fused to instruct the jury to disregard the limits and the district
court affirmed. The supreme court stated that under the facts of
the case the refusal to instruct the jury to disregard the limits was
harmless error, but stressed that Beta Eta was never intended to
take the issue of insurance to the jury.4 The court went on to ex-
plain that the result reached in Beta Eta and Shingleton, that of
revealing the existence of an insurer as a real party in interest, was
based on the rationale that it would justifiably reflect the insurer's
responsibility to satisfy any judgment.47
Addressing the severance issue, the court explained that Beta
Eta employed the permissive "may" when it held that the trial
judge may grant a severance to the named insurer.4 s "However,
. . . absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a ques-
tion of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the in-
surance policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insur-
ance coverage, there is no valid reason for a severance and it
should NOT be granted." 49 The court reasoned that to rule other-
wise would defeat the purpose of joining the insurer-"to reflect
the presence of financial responsibility which should be left appar-
ent before the jury."50
In Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Co.,5 1 the plaintiff brought
44. Id. at 165.
45. 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971). In Stecher the petitioners claimed conflict between the
Beta Eta and Shingleton decisions and the decision of the district court in the instant case.
46. One of the objectives of [Beta Eta] and [Shingleton] was to provide a disclosure
of policy limits between the parties which had not previously been allowed. The
reasons were for purposes of negotiation and to encourage settlement between the
parties and thus shorten litigation and speed up the courts' heavy trial dockets. It
was never intended that policy limits should go to the jury and Beta Eta expressly
said so.
Id. at 423 (emphasis in original).
47. The court noted that this approach obviated the ability of defense counsel to mislead
the jury into believing that the burden of satisfying a judgment would work financial hard-
ship upon the family of a sympathetic defendant. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 424 (emphasis in original).
50. Id.
51. 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973).
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suit for injuries resulting from a traffic accident and joined the de-
fendant and her liability insurance company. The liability carrier
was severed from the case and the jury returned a verdict for the
defendant.
The district court of appeal affirmed without an opinion. On pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari to the supreme court, the district
court's decision was quashed and the case remanded for reconsid-
eration in light of Stecher. On remand the district court held that
the trial court had erred when it granted the severance for the lia-
bility carrier, but that the severance was harmless. The supreme
court reversed and held that the granting of a severance to an in-
surance company for any reason except those enumerated in
Stecher could not be regarded as harmless error.52 The court rea-
soned that absent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, the
plaintiff's interest "in presenting to the jury the truest possible
picture of the existence of financial responsibility is much too im-
portant to allow the loss of that interest, through the granting of
severance."
53
IV. PRE-VanBibber LEGISLATION AND THE COURT'S RESPONSE
The legislature entered the joinder conflict with the enactment
of section 627.7262, Florida Statutes, 4 which became law on June
52. Id. at 502.
53. Id.
54. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (Supp. 1976) provided:
Nonjoinder of insurers.-
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant in an
action to determine the insured's liability. However, each insurer which does or
may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any judgment
which might be entered in the action shall file a statement, under oath, of a corpo-
rate officer setting forth the following information with regard to each known pol-
icy of insurance:
(a) The name of the insurer.
(b) The name of each insured.
(c) The limits of liability coverage.
(d) A statement of any policy or coverage defense which said insurer rea-
sonably believes is available to said insurer filing the statement at the time
of filing said statement.
(2) The statement required by subsection (1) shall be amended immediately
upon discovery of facts calling for an amendment to said statement.
(3) If the statement or any amendment thereto indicates that a policy or cover-
age defense has been or will be asserted, then the insurer may be joined as a party.
(4) After the rendition of a verdict, or final judgment by the court if the case is
tried without a jury, the insurer may be joined as a party and judgment may be
entered by the court based upon the statement or statements herein required.
(5) The rules of discovery shall be available to discover the existence and policy
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28, 1976.85 The essence of the statute was to prohibit the joinder of
an automobile liability insurer in an action against its insured prior
to first obtaining a final judgment against the insured. 5 However,
the statute did provide for the joinder of the insurer prior to final
judgment if the statement filed by the insurer as required by sub-
section (1) of the statute indicated that a policy or coverage de-
fense would be asserted. 7
The supreme court responded to the legislature's attempt to
sidestep the principles announced in Shingleton in Markert v.
Johnston.58 The Markert court saw the issue as whether the join-
der of a motor vehicle liability insurer, in a suit to determine the
liability of the insured, is a procedural aspect of trial reserved to
the supreme court by virtue of its exclusive rulemaking authority
granted by article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution, 59 or a
substantive right which the legislature can freely grant or with-
hold.60 The court declined to resolve the issue of whether Shin-
gleton established a substantive right to sue insurers in the ab-
sence of a legislative act on the subject, concluding that the
language of section 627.7262 made the resolution of that issue un-
necessary.6 ' In resolving the substantive/procedural issue, the court
stated that the language of the statute "provides rather clearly
provisions of liability insurance coverage.
55. Ch. 76-266, 1976 Fla. Laws 726.
56. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262(4) (Supp. 1976).
57. Id. § 627.7262(3).
58. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978). See generally Note, Nonjoinder of Motor Vehicle Lia-
bility Insurer Held Unconstitutional, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 739 (1979).
59. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) provides: "The supreme court shall adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts. ... See In re Clarification of Fla. Rules of Practice &
Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973). Contra Means, The Power To Regulate Practice and
Procedure in Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 442 (1980) (espousing proposition that
Florida Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is not exclusive).
60. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1004. The mention of insurers as distinct from their joinder
has been treated as a procedural subject immune from legislative alteration. See Carter v.
Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); School Board v.
Surette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973). Cf. School Board v. Price, 362 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1978).
61. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005. An argument advanced by the proponents of the statute
was that the issue of the joinder of insurers is simply a matter of public policy, the declara-
tion of which is primarily a legislative function. They asserted that only in the absence of a
constitutional or statutory declaration may the public policy of the state be determined by
the courts. The court's response was that
as a matter of constitutional imperative, only the Supreme Court has the power to
adopt rules of practice and procedure for Florida courts. The fact that our rules
may reflect the prevailing public policy-whether by design or by coinci-
dence-obviously does not enable the legislature to encroach on our rulemaking
authority.
Id. at 1005 n.8.
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that the joinder of insurers is merely a procedural step" in the law-
suit. 2 The court noted that the legislature, by enacting the statute,
had not altered the Shingleton policy of recognizing the insurers as
the real party in interest, but had merely specified the precise mo-
ment during the judicial proceeding in which the insurer is for-
mally recognized as a real party in interest.6 " Finally, the court
held section 627.7262, Florida Statutes, to be an invasion of the
court's rulemaking authority in violation of article II, section 3 of
the Florida Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional.,
Three years later, in Cozine v. Tullo 6 the supreme court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of section 768.045, Florida Statutes,"
a statute similar in all relevant respects to section 627.7262.67 The
court, in a four-three decision, held the statute unconstitutional
"[flor the reasons expressed in Markert v. Johnston."68
Justice McDonald, dissenting, felt that sections 627.7262(1) and
768.045 were not entirely procedural and therefore did not run
afoul of the court's exclusive procedural rulemaking power.69 He
noted that the court was upholding the right of an injured party to
join the insurer as a real party in interest, while at the same time
recognizing the authority of the legislature to relieve insurance
companies of the burdens of this rule.70 Justice McDonald opined
that few people truly believe that the presence or absence of an
insurance company in a suit does not affect the issue of liability or
62. Id. at 1005. The court cited to In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d
65, 66 (Fla. 1972) (Adkins, J., concurring), in which Justice Adkins defined "practice and
procedure" within the meaning of art. V, § 3 of the Florida Constitution.
63. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005.
64. Id. at 1006. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 prevents the powers of one branch of government
from being exercised by another branch.
Noting that the legislature had expressed the public policy of the state through the stat-
ute, Justice Alderman, concurring specially, proposed that the court adopt the substance of
§ 627.7262 as a rule of procedure. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1006 (Alderman, J., concurring).
See Lee & Mussetto, Insurance, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 765, 768-69 (1980), for a brief analysis
of the merits of Justice Alderman's suggestion.
65. 394 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1981).
66. (1977).
67. The principal difference between the two statutes was the inclusion of "liability" in
the title of § 768.045 and the exclusion of "motor vehicle" in the first sentence of that same
statute.
68. Cozine, 394 So. 2d at 115.
69. Id. at 116 (McDonald, J., dissenting, in an opinion in which Overton and Alderman,
JJ., concurred). It is interesting to note in light of the similarities between the two statutes
that Justices Overton and Alderman concurred in the majority opinion in Markert which
had held § 627.7262 unconstitutional as an impermissible encroachment upon the court's
exclusive rulemaking authority. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1006.
70. Cozine, 394 So. 2d at 116 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
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the amount of damages awarded. 71 In view of the legislature's legit-
imate interest in policing the field of insurance, he concluded that
because the legislature had determined that the public interest is
best served by the nonjoinder of the insurance company, the court
should recognize that interest and uphold the nonjoinder
statutes.72
V. THE REVISED STATUTE AND VanBibber
The Florida Insurance Code, which had been enacted in 1959,
was scheduled for blanket repeal on October 1, 1982. 73 In the pro-
cess of reviewing the entire Insurance Code, the legislature enacted
a revised version of section 627.7262. 74 The revised statute at-
tempts to create a substantive right of nonjoinder in the liability
insurance carrier as opposed to regulating the timing of joinder of
the carrier. The statute effectively transfers the accrual of a benefi-
cial interest in the injured plaintiff from the date of occurrence
until that time when the plaintiff's action against the insured has
matured to a judgment. Does the revised statute, like its predeces-
sor, violate article II, section 3, of the Florida Constitution by in-
vading the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking power?75 Was the
Shingleton decision to grant a right of action to an injured plaintiff
against the tortfeasor's insurer grounded on public policy consider-
ations, thus enabling the legislature to abrogate that right; or was
Shingleton grounded on constitutional principles which would
deny the legislature the power to abrogate that right and thereby
mandate the unconstitutionality of the revised statute?
A. The Court's Exclusive Rulemaking Authority
In VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance
71. Id.
72. Id. at 117. Justice McDonald gives the reader some indication of his views as to the
grounds for the Shingleton holding. Because it would be inconsistent for Justice McDonald
to argue the constitutionality of the statute in Cozine and at the same time argue that
Shingleton was grounded on constitutional principles, we can deduce that, in Justice Mc-
Donald's opinion, Shingleton was based on public policy considerations.
73. On April 7, 1982, during the fourth special session of the 1982 legislature, the revised
Insurance Code was passed by unanimous vote in both houses. Fla. H.R., Committee on
Insurance, Staff Report, 1982 Insurance Code Sunset Revision (Fla. HB 4F, as amended by
HB 10G), at 4 (1982).
74. Ch. 82-243, § 542, 1982 Fla. Laws 1553 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 627.7262
(1983)). See supra note 3 for the text of the revised statute.
75. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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Co., 76 the supreme court explained that because of the substantial
differences between the statute in Markert" and the present stat-
ute, the Markert decision was not controlling.78 The first perceived
difference was that "[t]he present statute requires, as a condition
precedent to having a third-party interest in the insurance policy,
the vesting of that interest by judgment; the prior statute did
not. '7 9 A second distinction was that "[t]he present statute specifi-
cally authorizes a contractual provision prohibiting direct third-
party suits; the prior one did not."80
The court found the revised statute to be substantive; therefore,
it would not fail on the grounds enunciated in Markert.81 The re-
vised statute is substantive in nature because it creates a right of
action in the injured plaintiff only after the condition precedent is
satisfied. It does not regulate the timing of joinder, as its predeces-
sor did, but merely permits joinder of the insurer at only one point
in the litigation, i.e., that point where the substantive right of ac-
tion accrues to the injured plaintiff through a final judgment
against the insured.
76. 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983). See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 54 for the text of the statute declared unconstitutional in Markert.
78. VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 882-83. VanBibber was a four-two-one decision. It is not
surprising to note that the majority consisted of Justice McDonald (author), Chief Justice
Alderman, and Justices Overton and Ehrlich. Justice McDonald authored the dissenting
opinion in Cozine, where he argued that the nonjoinder statutes were not entirely proce-
dural so as to run afoul of the exclusive rulemaking power of the court. Justices Alderman
and Overton concurred in that dissent.
It is interesting to note that Raymond Ehrlich, now Justice Ehrlich, filed an amicus curiae
brief in Shingleton on behalf of the American Insurance Association, American Mutual In-
surance Alliance, and the National Association of Independent Insurers.
Justice Shaw, joined by Justice Adkins, concurred in the VanBibber majority's determina-
tion that because the incident in the present case occurred prior to the effective date of §
627.7262, Florida Statutes (1983), and because there was no clear legislative intent to make
the statute retroactive, the statute was not applicable to the instant case. However, Justice
Shaw expressed the view, contrary to the majority opinion, that the statute was "unconsti-
tutional because it impermissibly abrogates a right of action which existed under the Florida
Constitution of 1885; unconstitutionally denies due process, and unconstitutionally denies or
delays the right of access to the courts under sections 9 and 21, respectively, article I, Flor-
ida Constitution of 1968." VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 883 (Shaw, J., concurring and
dissenting).
Justice Boyd, dissenting, would have held that the statute unconstitutionally encroaches
upon the supreme court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules of procedure. Id. at 886
(Boyd, J., dissenting).
79. VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 882-83.
80. Id. at 883 (footnote omitted).
81. Id.
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B. VanBibber's Right of Access to the Courts
The VanBibber court clearly stated that Shingleton was
grounded on that court's public policy determinations in the ab-
sence of any legislative action."' The court also recognized that
their policy considerations would have to yield to a valid, contrary
legislative pronouncement.8 Justice Shaw, concurring and dissent-
ing in VanBibber, argued that Shingleton was grounded on consti-
tutional principles as well as public policy considerations." He ar-
gued that by enacting the revised nonjoinder statute the legislature
had abrogated a right of action that existed under the Florida Con-
stitution of 1885 because it denied due process and delayed the
plaintiff's right of access to the courts.8 5 Language supporting Jus-
tice Shaw's argument can be found in Shingleton, where the court,
after recognizing that the "no action" provisions do not merely at-
tempt to defer the liability of the insured but, in addition, seek to
defer the right of an injured third party beneficiary to maintain a
cause of action against the insurer, stated that "[t]his hardly com-
ports with section 4, Declaration of Rights, State Constitution,...
that the courts shall be open so that persons injured shall have
remedy by due course of law without denial or delay."88
Citing this language from Shingleton, VanBibber argued that
the "no action" clause permitted to be inserted into liability poli-
cies as a result of the nonjoinder statute is, in effect, a denial of
access to the courts in the same manner as the "no action" policy
82. Id. See also Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005, where the majority stated that Shingleton
was decided on public policy considerations.
83. VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 883.
84. Id. at 884 (Shaw, J., concurring and dissenting).
85. Id. at 883. The tort suit in Shingleton was filed prior to June 1968 and was therefore
controlled by the Constitution of 1885.
86. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 717. The Declaration of Rights § 4, FLA. CONST. of 1885, is
currently FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. Section 21 provides: "The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay."
Section 21 has been interpreted by the court to mean
that where a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has
been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of
Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become
a part of the common law of the State pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 2.01, . . . the
Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasona-
ble alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for inju-
ries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the
abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public ne-
cessity can be shown.
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
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provision in Shingleton.8 7 If the policy provision in Shingleton vio-
lated an injured plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the
courts, then surely no act by the legislature can cure that constitu-
tional defect. In response, Hartford argued that the constitutional
guarantee to the redress of any injury and access to the courts bars
only the statutory abolition of an existing remedy without provid-
ing an alternative protection for the injured party.88 Hartford
stated that VanBibber's alternative remedy was to file an action
against the insured.8 9
C. VanBibber's Right to Due Process and Contractual Rights
VanBibber argued, and Justice Shaw agreed, both relying on Sh-
ingleton, that the nonjoinder statute violated her constitutional
right to due process of law.90 The Shingleton court had recognized
the importance of a plaintiff's right to sue defendants jointly, stat-
ing that it "is so universal and essential to due process that it can
rarely be curtailed or restricted by private contract between poten-
tial defendants."'" Apparently, the VanBibber court felt that it
had one of these rare situations before it.
Other language supporting VanBibber's due process argument
can be found in Shingleton, where the court, after recognizing the
state's interest in insurance regulation for the protection of the
public, reasoned that it would not be unreasonable to limit the ef-
fect of express contractual provisions where they would collide
with the interests of the public generally, "[w]here, for example,
they collide with principles of due process and equal protection,
and the right to a full and adequate remedy of law guaranteed all
citizens. '92 Again, the court in VanBibber did not discuss or even
acknowledge this language found in Shingleton.
The Florida Supreme Court recognized in Shingleton that an in-
surance contract is "no longer a private contract merely between
two parties."9 The Shingleton court rendered the third-party ben-
87. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9, VanBibber.
88. Respondent's Answer Brief at 17, VanBibber. See Faulkner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 367
So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 1979); Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
89. Respondent's Answer Brief at 17, VanBibber.
90. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 18, VanBibber. See VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 883 (Shaw,
J., concurring and dissenting).
91. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 717.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 716 (emphasis in original) (quoting Gothberg v. Nemerovski, 208 N.E.2d 12, 20
(Ill. App. Ct. 1965), which in turn was quoting Simmon v. Iowa Mutual Cas. Co., 121 N.E.2d
509, 511 (Ill. 1954)).
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eficiary doctrine applicable to automobile liability insurance con-
tracts and thereby recognized VanBibber's third-party beneficiary
contract rights. VanBibber argued that the application of the non-
joinder statute to her, a third-party beneficiary to the insurance
contract entered into by Hartford and its insured, would unconsti-
tutionally impair her contractual rights as provided by article I,
section 10, of the Florida Constitution." She further argued that
because her accident occurred prior to the effective date of the
nonjoinder statute, 5 she was governed by the law in effect at that
time.96 She contended that her contract rights on June 25, 1982
permitted her a direct cause of action against Hartford; the statute
would unconstitutionally deprive her of such a right. 7
While recognizing that the new statute became effective on Oc-
tober 1, 1982, Hartford argued that subsection (1) of the nonjoin-
der statute requires the injured plaintiff to obtain a judgment
against the insured as a condition precedent not only to the ac-
crual but also to the maintenance of a cause of action against a
liability insurer.9 8 It follows, therefore, that the nonjoinder statute
should apply to all existing lawsuits in which the liability insurer
has been named as a defendant.99
Finally, Hartford argued that the legislature of a state may mod-
94. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 19, VanBibber. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10 provides: "No bill
of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
At the present time the exact extent to which art. I, § 10 prohibits the passage of any law
impairing the obligation of contracts is unsettled. In Yamaha Parts Distrib. Inc. v. Ehrman,
316 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1975), the supreme court stated that virtually no degree of contract
impairment has been tolerated in this state. In Pomponio v. Claridge of Pompano Condo.,
Inc., 378 So. 2d 774, 779-80 (Fla. 1979), the court adopted the United States Supreme
Court's analysis of the federal contract clause. This analysis employs a balancing test, bal-
ancing the reasonableness, necessity, and purpose of the law against the parties' obligations
and rights under the contract. Clearly this analysis permits greater latitude on the part of
the state in enacting laws that will not be determined to be unconstitutional.
Finally, the court in State v. Chadbourne, 382 So. 2d 293, 297 (Fla. 1980), has returned to
the rigid, unflexible stance they took prior to Pomponio and stated that there is a "wall of
absolute prohibition" against laws impairing the obligations of contract. The question of
whether the court will take a stance that will strictly prohibit the impairment of contracts
or one employing a balancing test may depend upon whether Chadbourne will be distin-
guished as a case in which the state was a party to the contract, thereby exacting a stricter
prohibition against impairment under the federal analysis as adopted in Pomponio.
95. The injury giving rise to VanBibber's cause of action occurred on June 25, 1982. The
effective date of the statute was October 1, 1982. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 2, VanBibber;
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 16, VanBibber.
96. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 19-21, VanBibber. See Kirkland v. State, 424 So. 2d 925
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Galbreath v. Shortle, 416 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
97. Petitioner's Initial Brief at 21, VanBibber.
98. Respondent's Answer Brief at 20, VanBibber. See supra note 3 for text of statute.
99. Respondent's Answer Brief at 20, VanBibber.
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ify an existing remedy, including a statute of limitations, without
impairing the obligation of contracts as long as a sufficient alterna-
tive remedy is provided. 0  The legislature has not forever barred
VanBibber from bringing an action against Hartford, but has
merely required as a condition precedent thereto a judgment
against its insured. Quoting from the supreme court in Ruhl v.
Perry,01 Hartford concluded that "[ilf the legislature may modify
existing remedies by shortening or lengthening the statute of limi-
tations without impairing the obligation of contract, it may also
modify the time when a cause of action accrues."'' 2
Once again, the court in VanBibber did not express its opinion
on whether the application of the nonjoinder statute to VanBibber
would violate her contract rights. Because the court found the stat-
ute to be substantive, it would be applied prospectively only due to
the absence of a clear legislative intent that it should be applied
retroactively. 03 Thus, because the nonjoinder statute did not apply




The court's opinion in VanBibber was short and conclusory
rather than analytical. Perhaps because of extensive language in
Shingleton which implied that there would be constitutional trans-
gressions if an injured plaintiff were not permitted to join the in-
surer in a suit against the insured, the court felt that it could not
cogently distinguish Shingleton from VanBibber and therefore
opted to refrain from an analytical approach. Nevertheless, the
language of Shingleton remains unexplained by the court.
While the VanBibber court can be criticized for its failure to ad-
dress the constitutional issues raised by Shingleton, the court
should not be critized for the results it reached in VanBibber.
Has the legislature been permitted to regulate procedure under
the guise of substantive law? The cases of Shingleton, Markert,
and Cozine dealt with the timing of joinder, which is clearly a pro-
cedural issue, and not with whether a cause of action exists by vir-
tue of the substantive law. Section 627.7262, Florida Statutes,
100. Id. at 20-21 (citing Ruhl v. Perry, 390 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1980)).
101. 390 So. 2d at 356.
102. Respondent's Answer Brief at 21, VanBibber.
103. VanBibber, 439 So. 2d at 883.
104. Id.
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merely codifies the long accepted requirement in the majority of
jurisdictions that an injured party first obtain a judgment against
the insured before proceeding against his insurer. The statute rec-
ognizes that it is the judgment against the insured which gives the
injured party status as a third party beneficiary to the contract of
insurance between the insurer and the insured. Finally, section
627.7262 affirmatively grants a substantive right to insurers to in-
sert "no action" clauses in liability insurance policies pursuant to
the Shingleton court's unequivocal language which recognized the
legislature's authority to do so by virtue of its police power. 10
The question of whether a tortfeasor has purchased liability in-
surance or not simply should not enter into the jury's determina-
tion of liability. It is clear that the resolution of the factual issue of
liability does not require that the jury have knowledge of which
person or entity will bear the burden of satisfying a judgment. It is
the burden of the legislature, pursuant to the substantive law, to
determine risk and loss allocation. While it is understandable that
a jury would rather see a large financial institution respond to a
loss as opposed to an individual, such a determination is clearly
outside the scope of the function of the jury.
The proponents of the nonjoinder statute advance the economic
argument that the jury will augment damages awarded, or even
find liability in the first instance, if it perceives that an insurance
carrier rather than an individual will bear the loss. However, where
the insured is itself a financially strong business entity as was the
case in VanBibber, the joinder of the insurance company should
have little or no effect on the jury. In such a situation the jury
perceives that the loss will rest upon one who is capable of bearing
it, just as it arguably does when an insurer is joined as a party
defendant.
Resting its decision on a determination of public policy, the Sh-
ingleton court recognized a substantive right of an individual to
join an insurer in an action against the tortfeasor pursuant to its
determination of the common law. The legislature, however, has
now acted with respect to the subject matter of those substantive
rights and has made its determination as to the prevailing public
policy of the state of Florida. The supreme court, therefore, acted
properly in not substituting its judgment for that of the legislature,
105. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718-19.
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no matter how wise, foolish, harsh, or lenient the statute appears
to the court.
BRIAN G. PINCKET
